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The Courts and the Economy in a New 




Since the 1980s, the South African economy has been in a 
parlous state. The value of the rand, South Africa's currency, has 
declined precipitously in international markets.! At home, an ever 
greater number of blacks have entered a shrinking job market 
each year. 2 Unemployment has reached new heights. 3 At the same 
time, South Africa has experienced many of the inflationary prob-
lems-albeit in a milder form-that have long plagued the econ-
omies of many Latin American countries.4 Such inflation has 
made life even more difficult for the estimated 30.3 million blacks 
comprising approximately 86 percent of the population. 5 Not 
surprisingly, an unprecedented rise in crime has accompanied 
the growth of South Africa's economic woes.6 
t Copyright © 1991 Lynn Berat. 
* J.D. (Texas); Ph.D. (Yale). Member of the Texas Bar. The author, a Lecturer and 
the Assistant Coordinator of the Career Development Fellowship Program for Black 
Southern Africans at Yale, is also a regular consultant to the Ford Foundation on South 
African and Namibian issues. 
I Compare foreign exchange rates, N.V. TIMES, July 1, 1981, at D12 with foreign 
exchange rates, N. Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1991, at D 17. 
2 See generally SOUTH AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF RACE RELATIONS, SURVEY OF RACE RELA-
TIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA (1980-1990 editions). The word "black" in this Article refers to 
those who, until recently, were classified by the government as African, Asian, and 
Coloured. 
3 For example, a survey conducted in the Grahamstown and Port Elizabeth areas in 
1984 found the level of unemployment close to 40 percent. By 1988, the Institute for 
Social and Economic Research at Rhodes University reported that the figure for Gra-
hamstown had risen to between 60 and 70 percent. UPROOTING POVERTY: THE SOUTH 
AFRICAN CHALLENGE 91 (Francis Wilson & Mamphela Ramphele eds., 1989). 
4 See generally id. at 249-53. 
5 LEONARD THOMPSON, A HISTORY OF' SOUTH AFRICA 243 (1990). 
6 See, e.g., Audrey D'Angelo & Daniel Simon, Muggings Drive Off Tourists, CAPE TIMES, 
July 19, 1991, at 2. 
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Now, as both the government and leading anti-apartheid 
groups such as the African National Congress (ANCr struggle 
for a way out of the socio-economic morass created by more than 
forty years of National Party rule,8 the problem of salvaging and 
revitalizing the economy demands attention. There is, however, 
little agreement on the nature of a post-apartheid economy. While 
general statements of principle abound,9 concrete ideas are few. 10 
The future role of the judiciary in South Africa is an additional 
source of uncertainty. I I Will the judges be willing or, indeed, 
permitted to consider economic questions? Even if they do ad-
dress them, will they be reluctant to interfere with government 
policy or will they pursue a conservative policy, striking down 
parliamentary economic policy they believe unduly interferes 
with financial agreements? The resolution of these issues will 
determine South Africa's course well into the next century. 
One solution for some of South Africa's difficulties would be 
for the country to adhere to a system of indexation by adjusting 
the face value of savings accounts, mortgage debts, and other 
financial instruments so that they keep pace with inflation. Such 
a system has worked particularly well in Brazil. The influence of 
U.S. jurisprudence, however, in the South African legal com-
munity might cause South African courts to block parliamentary 
attempts to introduce indexation. 
This Article proposes that South Africa adopt a system of 
indexation. Part I briefly examines current South African views 
about the economy and the role of the judges. Part II explores 
the success of the Brazilian model during its formative decades 
of the 1970s and 1980s. Part III discusses the Gold Clause deci-
7 The African National Congress is described in TOM LODGE, BLACK POLITICS IN SOUTH 
AFRICA SINCE 1945 1-3,26-28,77-84,298-303 (1983). 
8 The National Party first came to power in 1948 with the slogan "apartheid." The 
Party is described in THOMPSON, supra note 5, at 162, 187-88, 190, 198, 207, 223-26, 
234,237. 
9 See, e.g., African National Congress, A Bill of Rights for a Democratic South Africa-
Working Draft for Consultation as prepared by the Constitutional Committee of the 
African National Congress, arts. 10-11, reprinted in MONITOR (Dec. 1990). 
!O See, e.g., David Porteious, Bank Nationalization in South Africa: Implications and 
Alternatives, paper presented at the Yale University Southern African Research Program, 
Fall 1990 (on file with the Yale University Southern African Research Program, New 
Haven, CT). 
II The role of the judiciary is described in Lynn Berat, A New South Africa?: Prospects 
for an Africanist Bill of Rights and a Transformed Judiciary, 13 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMPo L. 
REV. 467 (1991). 
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sions and reveals how Brazilian attitudes toward its government's 
economic role in society have differed from U.S. norms. This 
section further specifies how Brazilian ideas would clash with 
South African judges influenced by U.S. conservatism. Finally, 
this Article suggests how, even with economic conservatives on 
the bench, the South African courts could permit the develop-
ment of a structural analogue to the Brazilian system. 
I. THE SOUTH AFRICAN DEBATE: THE ECONOMY AND THE ROLE 
OF THE JUDGES 
The South African legal system has been characterized by in-
tense rule-making and little respect for human rights. Indeed, 
the legislature has never adhered to the rule of law with regard 
to blacks. 12 Only by abrogating black rights has the white-minority 
regime been able to ensure its survival. Particularly since the 
ruling National Party came to power in 1948, the government 
has continually enlarged its arsenal of security legislation. Fur-
thermore, since 1983, the government has concentrated ever 
greater powers in the hands of the executive. 13 Underlying this 
executive-minded behavior has been an obsession with legalism-
the view that such laws, no matter how draconian, are just, simply 
because they are laws. 
The all-white and nearly all-male South African judiciary, 
which has been reluctant to challenge the executive, has helped 
reinforce this obsession with legalism. Supporters of legalism 
maintain that the proper role of the judiciary in a system of 
parliamentary supremacy is to declare the law and not to make 
it.14 The judges' task is only to see that the manner of promul-
gation was procedurally correct and that executive action was 
taken "in terms of" the legislation. 
In practice, however, this positivistic justification has been an 
excuse for the generally conservative judges, many of whom sup-
port the ruling National Party, to lend approval to the underlying 
12 Lynn Berat, Harmonizing Competing Ethnonationalisms?: A Bill of Rights for a New South 
Africa, 19 J. POL. SCI. 90 (1991). 
13 See generally Lynn Berat, Conscientious Objection in South Africa: Governmental Paranoia 
and the Law of Conscription, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 128, 158-76 (1989); Lynn Berat, 
Doctors, Detainees and Torture: Medical Ethics v. the Law in South Africa, 25 STAN. J. INT'L L. 
499,528-31 (1989). 
14 Dian Bassan, Judicial Activism in a State of Emergency: an Examination of Recent Decisions 
of the South African Courts, 3 S.A. J. HUM. RTS. 42-43 (1987). 
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moral assumptions of the legislation they are called upon to con-
strue. South African jurist M.G. Cowling has argued that "within 
the framework of legislative supremacy, the positivistic approach 
to judicial decision-making provides an extremely convenient 
cloak behind which judges can hide their 'inarticulate major 
premises' by attributing inequitable results to the legislation."15 
According to Cowling, these premises are the "underlying mo-
tives, perceptions, [and] political outlook[s] that mould a judge's 
interpretation of the law as it is envisioned by the legislature."16 
In the South African case, it is not implausible to suggest that, 
for many judges, such premises include beliefs in white domi-
nation and continued hegemony, the need to preserve state se-
curity, and fear of communism. 
The unhappy result of the judiciary's captivity to such views 
has been that instead of protecting human rights, the courts-
especially the Appellate Division, South Africa's highest court-
have routinely upheld the draconian will of the executive,l7 In 
many cases, the courts have deferred to the executive's authority 
in matters concerning state security.18 Such decisions are made 
routinely at the expense of the black majority. 
Certain members of the South African legal community have 
criticized this judicial conservatism. Some South African scholars 
have suggested that more liberal judges should resign in an effort 
to underscore the proposition that, under present conditions, it 
is inappropriate to speak of an independent judiciary.19 Such 
scholars have also called for a redefinition of the role of the 
judiciary and have argued that South Africa should adopt a bill 
of rights to free judges from the constraints of legislative suprem-
acy.20 According to this view, the entrenchment of a bill of rights 
15 M.G. Cowling, Judges and the Protection of Human Rights in South Africa: Articulating 
the Inarticulate Premise, 3 S.A.]. HUM. RTS. 180, 189 (1987). 
16 Id. 
17 See generally Etienne Mureinik, Pursuing Principle: The Appellate Division Under the State 
of Emergency, 5 S.A.]. HUM. RTS. 60 (1989). 
18 See, e.g., Omar v. Minister of Law and Order, 1987 (3) SA 859 (A) (discussing audi 
alteram partem rule); Fani v. Minister of Law and Order (ECD Case No. 184011985, 
unreported) (discussing audi alteram partem rule); Bill v. State President, 1987 (1) SA 
265 (W) (discussing audi alteram partem rule). In the Appellate Division case, Omar 
included the appeals in Fani and Bill. 
19 See generally Raymond Wacks, Judges and Injustice, 101 S.A.L.]. 266 (1984); John 
Dugard, Should Judges Resign?-A Reply to Professor Wachs, 101 S.A.L.]. 286 (1984). 
20 Cowling, supra note 15, at 196. 
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would not only protect individual rights and freedoms but also 
serve to promote the institutional integrity of the judiciary.21 
As progressive scholars have sought enactment of a bill of 
rights, conservative members of the politico-legal establishment 
also have turned their attention toward that goal. Conservative 
interest, however, springs not from their desire to nurture the 
rule of law in a non-racial democratic state but from their per-
ception that the days of white minority rule are numbered. They 
view a bill of rights a~ the best way to safeguard property and 
minority rights. With such disparate views, it is not surprising 
that disagreements over what form such a document should take 
are profound. 
As a political battle rages over the economic structure of a post-
apartheid South Africa, both sides make much of the concept of 
economic rights. Many aligned with the broad coalition of anti-
apartheid groups known as the Mass Democratic Movement be-
lieve that any proposed bill of rights must guarantee, or at least 
not obstruct, the economic redistribution that must follow the 
abolition of the apartheid state. Without such redistribution mea-
sures, the members of the white community will simply substitute 
their current racially-defined supremacy with an economically-
defined one. Such economically-defined supremacy would reflect 
their already superior economic status, a status acquired at the 
expense of blacks. 22 Moreover, the guarantee of certain minimal 
economic standards will be the only way of giving meaning to 
blacks' newly-secured political rights. As black advocate Ernest 
Moseneke contends: "[t]he right to development ... is probably 
more crucial than the right to vote; not as a favour which some-
body hands out, but a right that you can claim and enforce ... 
anything less than that is going to in effect perpetuate the present 
system."23 
For many blacks, capitalism, as practiced in South Africa, and 
civil liberties, as propounded by the government and interpreted 
by the judiciary, are wedded in a conspiracy of oppression. This 
conspiracy is aimed at preserving and perpetuating inequality in 
21 C. Weeramantry, The Constitutional Reconstruction of South Africa: Some Essential Safe-
guards, 3 LESOTHO L.J. 1, 16 (1987). 
22 Dennis Davis, Legality and Struggle: Towards a View of a Bill of Rights for South Africa, 
in A BILL OF RIGHTS FOR SOUTH AFRICA 179 (Johan Van der Westhuizen & Henning 
Viljoen eds., 1988). 
23 Ernest Moseneke, quoted in, Panel Discussion, A BILL OF RIGHTS FOR SOUTH AFRICA, 
supra note 22, at 149. 
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economic relations. In this context, the ANC is not so much 
concerned with individual property rights as it is with the enor-
mous concentration of monopoly capital in a few huge white-
controlled corporations and holding companies. Drawing from 
the 1955 Freedom Charter,24 ANC draft constitutional guidelines, 
proposed in 1989, emphasized the need to vest the state "with 
the right to determine the general context in which economic life 
takes place and define and limit the rights and obligations attach-
ing to the ownership and use of productive capacity."25 The doc-
ument distinguished between individual property owners and the 
collective wealth of corporations. Accordingly, the draft consti-
tutional guidelines envisioned that "[p]roperty for personal use 
and consumption shall be constitutionally entrenched"26 while 
privately-owned companies and transnational corporations "shall 
be obliged to co-operate with the state in realizing the objectives 
of the Freedom Charter in promoting social well-being."27 
The government, in contrast, has not offered any solutions 
capable of satisfying both whites and blacks and has favored 
maintaining the status quo protecting existing white property 
rights. This preference manifested itself in the South African 
Law Commission's (Commission) 1989 Working Paper on Group 
and Human Rights. 28 The Commission, established in 1973 by an 
Act of Parliament, consisted of members of the judiciary, the 
legal profession (including academic lawyers), the magistrates' 
bench, and officials of the Department of Justice. Its mandate 
was "to investigate and make recommendations on the definition 
and protection of group rights in the context of the South African 
constitutional set-up and the possible extension of the existing 
protection of individual rights as well as the role the courts play 
or should play .... "29 The Commission stressed that economic 
rights should be protected only "in the negative sense that legis-
24 On June 26, 1955, three thousand delegates of all racial groups met at Kliptown, 
near Johannesburg, and adopted a Freedom Charter which, among other things, stipu-
lated that "South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white .... " The text of 
the Charter is reprinted in THOMAS KARIS & GWENDOLYN CARTER, 3 FROM PROTEST TO 
CHALLENGE 205 (1977). 
25 AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS, CONSTITUTIONAL GUIDELINES FOR A DEMOCRATIC 
SOUTH AFRICA (1989), d. (0). 
26 [d. at d. (T). 
27 [d. at d. (P). 
28 See generally S.A. L. COMM., PROJECT 58: GROUP AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1989) [here-
inafter S.A. L. COMM. REP.]. 
29 [d. at Introduction, 4. 
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lation and executive acts shall not infringe them. A bill of rights 
is not the place for enforcing positive obligations against the 
state."30 
A number of white legal scholars have justified this resistance 
to constitutional guarantees of economic redistribution, question-
ing judicial competence to deal with such matters. Legal scholar 
M.G. Cowling and Natal Judge John Didcott contend that the 
judiciary is ill-equipped to deal with issues of economic policy.31 
A bill of rights, in their view, should be free of economic stan-
dards to which the central government would be bound and the 
judiciary obliged to review. As to property rights, they insist that 
the judges be neither spoilers of economic redistribution nor 
rubber stamps for arbitrary expropriation. They are determined 
that there be a neutral bill of rights to act as shield and not a 
sword. This neutrality is crucial, they maintain, because South 
African judges are neither qualified nor in possession of the 
resources and enforcement capabilities necessary to adjudicate 
issues arising out of economic restructuring.32 Such questions, 
they argue, are really "political" problems and not germane to 
jurisprudential deliberation. 
Unfortunately, these observers fail to explain why the judges 
would be ill-equipped to pass on such matters. One possible ex-
planation appears in the Commission report's distinction between 
positive and negative rights. 33 Substantive rights seek to prevent 
the state from infringing upon individual liberties, while eco-
nomic rights seek to compel the state to fulfill an obligation. Thus, 
it is for the judges to determine that the state has acted arbitrarily 
and not that it has failed to comply with minimal economic guar-
antees. 
This argument, however, is unpersuasive. If the judges can 
ascertain whether the state has abrogated fundamental freedoms 
such as freedom of the press or speech, they can just as easily 
determine whether the government has failed to strive for the 
minimum standards enshrined in the constitution. To suggest 
that these are political problems not appropriate for adjudication 
30 [d. at § 9.1. 
3I John Didcott, Practical Workings of a Bill of Rights, in A BILL OF RIGHTS FOR SOUTH 
AFRICA, supra note 22, at 60; Cowling, supra note 15, at 179. 
,. Cowling, supra note 15, at 179. 
33 S.A. L. COMM. REp., supra note 28, at 9.1. 
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is to engage in perpetuating the positivist myth upon which the 
South African judiciary has relied for decades. 
While the debate about the economy and the role of the judi-
ciary rages on, those on both sides would do well to consider the 
implications of their positions. If the judges are unwilling to 
interfere with government policy, would they continue to show 
such deference to parliamentary policy interfering with existing 
financial agreements? This issue certainly would materialize if the 
South African government, in an attempt to control inflation and 
to raise the funds necessary to reverse the effects of economic 
apartheid, adopted a system of indexation similar to that of 
Brazil. 
II. THE BRAZILIAN MODEL 
Beginning in the late 1950s, Brazil adopted a system of index-
ation, thereby adjusting for inflation the face value of government 
debt securities, tax liabilities, and certain private debt instru-
ments. This system was designed to alleviate the destabilizing 
effects of inflation on investment patterns by guaranteeing inves-
tors a return on the purchasing power of their original investment 
as opposed to the nominal currency value of that investment. The 
government also intended the indexation system to help fund its 
operations in two ways. First, indexation would make government 
debt securities more attractive to investors in Brazil's inflationary 
economy. Second, indexation would eliminate the incentive for 
taxpayers to delay payment of their taxes. Brazilian indexing has 
been the subject of numerous studies, particularly in the United 
States. These studies have examined indexation's application to 
wages, realty, rental and mortgage markets,34 corporate income 
taxation,35 damage awards for tort victims,36 and eminent domain 
compensation.37 The system, however, is not widely known in 
South Africa. 
34 George Lefcoe, Monetary Correction and Mortgage Lending in Brazil: Observations for the 
United States, 21 STAN. L. REV. lO6 (1968); Keith Rosenn, Controlled Rents and Uncontrolled 
Inflation: The Brazilian Dilemma, 17 AM.]. COMPo L. 239 (1969). 
35 Keith Rosenn, Adjusting Taxation of Business Income for Inflation: Lessons from Brazil and 
Chile, 13 TEX. INT'L L.]. 165 (1978); Keith Rosenn, Adaptation of the Brazilian Income Tax 
to Inflation, 21 STAN. L. REv. 58 (1968) [hereinafter Rosenn, Adaptation]. 
36 KENNETH KARST & KEITH ROSENN, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA 496-
509 (1975). 
37 Keith Rosenn, Expropriation in Argentina and Brazil: Theory and Practice, 15 VA.]. INT'L 
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A few types of indexation existed in Brazil prior to 1964 when 
the Brazilian military removed J03.0 Goulart's populist govern-
ment. There were semi-automation adjustments for progressive 
tax brackets,38 indexation of the capital base upon which the 
Brazilian excess profits tax was levied,39 indexation of some rental 
agreements,40 and indexation of certain financial operations of 
some public and semi-public institutions.41 Pursuant to a 1957 
law authorizing the issuance of Brazilian Treasury obligations "in 
order to finance the nation's deficits and combat inflation," the 
government contemplated giving some treasury paper a "guar-
anty clause against the eventual devaluation of [Brazilian] cur-
rency, in accord with indices to be released by the National Eco-
nomic Council."42 The government, however, never used the 
authority granted by the 1957 law.43 
Once the Goulart government fell, the military installed several 
of Brazil's leading economists in positions where they were ex-
pected to restructure the country's private and governmental 
financial systems.44 Part of this restructuring included monetary 
correction of government obligations and tax arrears. Article 1 
of Law No. 4,357 of July 16, 1964 (1964 Law) authorized Brazil's 
executive branch to issue treasury obligations, later called Obri-
gacoes Reajustaveis do Tesouro Nacional (ORTNs), with varying 
maturities and a fixed rate of interest calculated as a percentage 
of the adjusted principal amount.45 The value of the principal 
was to be "periodically adjusted in accordance with the variations 
in the purchasing power of the national currency. "46 The law 
directed the Ministry of Finance to announce new nominal values 
L. 277 (1975); Keith Rosenn, Expropriation, Inflation and Development, 1972 WIS. L. REv. 
845. 
S8 Law No. 4,140 of Sept. 21, 1962; Law No. 3,898 of May 19, 1961. All Brazilian 
papers referred to in this Article are reprinted in COLLECAO DAs LEIS. 
s. Law No. 4,242 of July 17, 1963; Law No. 3,470 of Nov. 28,1958, art. 56; Law No. 
2,862 of Sept. 24, 1956. 
40 JULIAN CHACEL ET AL., 1 INVESTIMENTOS PRIVADOS E INFLACAO: A EXPERIENCIA 
BRASILEIRA 92 (1970). 
41 Decree No. 1,120 of June 12, 1962; Decree No. 786 of Mar. 1962; Decree No. 787 
of Mar. 12, 1962, CHACEL ET AL., supra note 40, at 65. 
42 Law No. 3,337 of Dec. 12, 1957, arts. 1,4. 
4S WALTER NESS, A INFLUENCIA DA CORRECAO MONETARIA No SISTEMA FINANCEIRO 47 
(1977). 
44 ROBERTO DE OLIVEIRA CAMPOS & MARIO SIMONSEN, A NOVA ECONOMIA BRASILEIRA 
41 (1974). 
45 Law No. 4,357 of July 16, 1964, art. 1. 
46 Id. art. I, § 1. 
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each quarter,47 authorized the public to use bonds for tax pay-
ments thirty days after reaching maturity,48 and gave the Minister 
of Finance the requisite authority to place and redeem the 
bonds.49 The law exempted the nominal gain from the revalua-
tion of the principal from taxation. 50 Finally, it stated that allo-
cations necessary to service the interest and to amortize principal 
payments would be included in the national budget. 51 
The Brazilian system, with its frequent rule changes, has be-
come the foundation for key areas of modern Brazilian finance. 
Indeed, the general purpose of monetary correction may be in-
ferred from the face of the 1964 statute and the relevant financial 
background. Prior to 1964, the Brazilian Treasury was only spo-
radically successful in placing its obligations. This limited success 
resulted principally because obligations available in 1962 gener-
ally bore only 6 or 7 percent interest52 at a time when the Brazilian 
rate of inflation was considerably higher, and the public's confi-
dence in the government's promise to repay was low. Most pre-
1964 borrowing was accomplished by compulsory loans,53 yet 
significant unfinanced budget deficits remained. The pre-1964 
market would not justify expectations of a spontaneous market 
for fixed-interest public debt with ordinary terms. Thus, the gov-
ernment apparently intended the promise of a positive return to 
make possible a market for Brazilian public debt, and thereby 
permit financing of the budgetary deficit. 
Nevertheless, much of the early subscription to the ORTNs 
was involuntary. Indeed, 73 percent of the ORTNs placed in 
1964 were either involuntary subscriptions or alternatives to tax-
ation.54 By 1966, only 17 percent of the subscriptions were in-
voluntary or alternatives to taxation, and by 1974 this figure had 
fallen to 3 percent.55 Still, various Brazilian governmental instru-
mentalities, commercial banks, which were permitted to hold a 
portion of their reserves as ORTNs, and insurance companies, 
which were required to invest a portion of their reserves in 
47 [d. art. I, § 2. 
48 [d. art. I, § 4. 
49 [d. art. I, § 6. 
50 [d. art. I, § 7. 
51 !d. art. I, § 8. 
52 Law No. 4,069 of June II, 1962; Law No. 2,977 of Nov. 28, 1956. 
53 CHACEL, supra note 40, at 282. 
54 On alternatives to taxation, see supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text. 
S5 M. SILVA, A DIVIDA Do SETOR PUBLICO BRASILEIRO 58 (1976). 
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ORTNs, have continued to hold a very large portion of the 
ORTNs issued. Accordingly, the market for ORTNs has re-
mained less than fully spontaneous. 56 Even so, the indexation 
system has allowed the government to finance a major portion of 
its deficit by public and quasi-public borrowing instead of by 
printing money or borrowing from the Brazilian central banking 
authorities. 
Article 7 of the 1964 Law required readjustment of the nominal 
value of tax arrears and other debts to the government not paid 
during the quarter in which they were due. As with the ORTNs, 
there was no detailed exposition of the means of calculating the 
value; the debts were required to "have their value adjusted in 
accord with variations in the purchasing power of the national 
currency."57 Article 7 also allocated administrative responsibility 
for the calculation of monetary correction of tax arrears and 
ORTNs, and mandated that coefficients of monetary correction 
be published quarterly in the Diario Official. 58 If judicial or ad-
ministrative action suspended collection of a tax payment, then 
reevaluation would be necessary. Nevertheless, if tax payment 
was eventually required, any required return of the sum depos-
ited would be subject to revaluation unless the amount in question 
had been appropriately deposited in cash.59 Article 7 also pro-
vided that all then-existing percentages and interest penalties that 
were due the government because of any delay in making a 
payment would be assessed as a percentage of the new, revalued 
debt.60 
In addition, article 7 indexed tax arrears, including money in 
arrears on the effective date of the law. This retroactive indexa-
tion of tax arrears was met with criticism61 and subsequently was 
eliminated.62 Prior to 1964, delay of tax payment often was prof-
itable because penalties and interest were small in relation to 
inflation. From 1962 until the new law became effective, the 
penalty for non-payment was 10 percent for each half year of 
delay, with an additional monthly interest charge of 1 percent.63 
56 Id. 
57 Law No. 4,357 of July 16, 1964, art. 7. 
58 Id. art. 7, § 1. 
59 Id. art. 7, § 2. 
60 Id. art. 7, § 6.58. 
61 CHACEL, supra note 40, at 106-07. 
62 Law No. 4,682 of Nov. 29, 1965, art. 15. 
63 Rosenn, Adaptation, supra note 35, at 70. At the same time, the Banco Brasil issued 
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Thus, when prices were rising at approximately an 80 percent 
annual rate in 1963, the full annual cost for nonpayment of taxes 
was substantially less than the rate of inflation. Ordinary corpo-
rate planning during those years involved financing the enter-
prise through delay in tax payment.64 Monetary correction of tax 
arrears may have increased tax revenues by destroying much of 
the incentive to delay tax payment in an economy subject to 
chronic inflation. 
After receiving authorization to issue ORTNs in July 1964, the 
government promulgated laws permitting indexation of various 
instruments used by private parties and local governments. Ad-
justments under these laws were tied to the change in nominal 
value of the ORTN.65 The instruments included corporate 
bonds,66 certain types of insurance,67 bank certificates of deposit,68 
real estate letters,69 housing rentals,'O various long-term loans,7! 
some mortgages,72 and state and municipal bonds.73 Through 
legislation enacted in June 1977, for all but a few financial obli-
gations, the government withdrew the authority to use any index 
other than one based upon the nominal variations in the ORTN.74 
By the terms of the June 1977 statute, previous provisions au-
thorizing the use of another index became void; the ORTN index 
immediately was substituted for any other index unless the trans-
action fell into one ofthe statutory exceptions.75 Thus, the ORTN 
index had become the hub of Brazil's financial system. 
The 1964 Law provided that the value of ORTNs would be 
adjusted "in accordance with the variations in the purchasing 
short-term instruments that financed foreign trade; they carried an annual return of 
approximately 55 percent. CAMPOS & SIMONSEN, supra note 44, at 121. 
64 J. Bulhoes, Financial Recuperation for Economic Expansion, in THE ECONOMY OF BRAZIL 
162 (1968). 
65 J. BULHOES PEDREIRA & M. RIBEIRO DA CRUZ, MANUAL DA CORRECAO MONETARIA 
DAS DEMONSTRACOES FINANCEIRAS 28 (1978). 
66 Law No. 4,728 of July 14, 1965. 
67 Law No. 5,488 of Aug. 27, 1968; Decree No. 73 of Nov. 21, 1968. 
68 Law No. 4,728 of July 14, 1965. 
69 Id. art. 45, § 6. 
70 Law No. 6,146 of Nov. 29, 1974. 
71 Law No. 4,728 of July 14, 1965. 
72 Law No. 4,380 of Aug. 21, 1964, amended by Law No. 4,728 of July 14, 1965, art. 
26. 
73 CONSTITUCAO art. 69, § 2 (1967). 
74 Law No. 6,423 of June 23, 1977. 
75 Id. 
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power of the national currency. "76 The 1964 Law did not indicate 
the method by which the table of coefficients-the means by 
which the index is calculated-would be determined; it indicated 
only which governmental body would establish the indices.77 Since 
1964, the government has altered the method of calculation sev-
eral times. These changes have been applied both to ORTNs 
already in circulation and to private obligations tied to the nom-
inal value of the ORTN. Such changes in the methods of calcu-
lation have not necessarily benefited the government. If the ag-
gregate debt due the government exceeded the aggregate bond 
and other debt owed by the government at the time of an index 
change, then the government actually could lose revenue by re-
defining the rules of indexation. In addition, to the extent that 
the reordering of the index affected private obligations, the gov-
ernment's revenues were not affected directly at all. 
Originally, the government based the monetary correction coef-
ficients upon the change in average wholesale prices in one quar-
ter of the year compared to prices in the previous quarter, with 
a delay of an additional quarter until the coefficients would be-
come effective.78 Thus, an adjustment scheduled to take effect in 
July was based on average wholesale prices in January, February, 
and March, as compared to the average wholesale prices in Oc-
tober, November, and December of the previous year. In October 
1969, the government adopted a three month moving average, 
also with a three month delay.79 Then, in May 1976, when the 
government expected a decrease in the rate of inflation, it altered 
the indexed calculation so that the delay would be only one month 
instead of three.80 This change effectively decreased the mone-
tary correction adjustment as the rate of inflation decreased. 
In October 1969, the government eliminated price changes in 
exports from the index. Retaining the price of exported goods 
actually overcompensated for the "variation in the purchasing 
power of the national currency,"81 as long as the weighted average 
price of exported items rose more quickly than that of domestic 
items. The government was paying its domestic creditors more 
76 Law No. 4,357 of July 16, 1964, art. 1, § 1. 
77 Id. art. 7, § 1. 
78 Decree No. 1,281 of July 24,1973. 
79 CHACEL, supra note 40, at 113. 
80 NESS, supra note 43, at 42. 
81 Law No. 4,357 of July 16, 1964. 
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than they needed to regain their former purchasing power. Thus, 
the government weighted the index appropriately to offset the 
effect of that portion of an item that was exported.82 
In December 1972, the rate of inflation in Brazil decreased. 
The government again responded by modifying the index, which 
had been based entirely upon previous inflation, so that a gov-
ernment estimate of the expected rate of inflation for the ensuing 
year would receive nearly equal weight with past inflation.83 For 
some time, the government did not publicly reveal the formula 
indicating the weight of past and expected inflation. Thus, buyers 
and sellers of indexed instruments tied to the ORTN bought and 
sold while accepting the risk of recalculation. At the end of 1973, 
the government sought to have a monetary correction index of 
approximately the same percentage as its goal for inflation for 
that year-no more than 12.0 percent. It abandoned the weighted 
formula, which would have resulted in monetary correction of 
14.3 percent, and adjusted the index to 12.8 percent. The gov-
ernment alleviated long-run distortions by compensating upward 
revisions in the index during the first quarter of 1974.84 
In March 1974, the rate of inflation began to accelerate and 
the government eliminated its estimate of inflation as a compo-
nent of the index. Inclusion of a realistic estimate would have 
increased the applicable monetary correction due bondholders. 
In May 1976, however, when inflation was again expected to 
decelerate, the government once more included a weighted rate 
of expected inflation in the index. 
In 1975, the government decided to eliminate from the mon-
etary correction index what many viewed as inflationary acci-
dents. Although it did not announce specific criteria for deter-
mining whether a price rise was fortuitous, such increases 
included those due to seasonal fluctuations, droughts and frosts, 
and price rises in oil mandated by the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC).85 The effect was substantial. In 
August 1975, the index rose 2.85 percent before and 1.37 percent 
after being cleansed of inflationary accidents. The domestic 
wholesale price index, the previous basis for ORTN adjustments, 
82 Injiaeao. Correeao Monetaria e Indices de Preeos. CON. ECON. 91-92 (Sept. 1975) [here-
inafter Injiacao l. 
83 NESS. supra note 43. at 42. 
84 Id. at 42-43. 
85 Injiacao. supra note 82. at 91-92. 
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rose 13 percent during the second half of 1975; when inflationary 
accidents were eliminated, it rose 11.1 percent. Two factors ex-
plain why the government faced only limited criticism that the 
government would have greater difficulty in placing its bonds.86 
First, the government promised a 4 percent per annum limit on 
the total percentage variation due to such changes. Second, the 
technical literature provided support for the macroeconomic de-
sirability of eliminating price increases in imports from some 
aspects of national indexation plans. A rise in an import's price 
is, in effect, an external "tax" which lowers an entire nation's 
standard of living. From the standpoint of both fairness and 
efficiency, no single group should bear the burden of this national 
tax. 
In mid-1976, the government dampened the index directly. It 
would figure into the ORTN index only 80 percent of that part 
of the wholesale price index that exceeded a 15 percent annual 
rise in prices. Additionally, at that time, many viewed full index-
ation as an unjustified inflationary accelerator, therefore the gov-
ernment generally discontinued public sales of new issues of 
ORTNs. Consequently, for several years thereafter, there were 
only certain compulsory and regulated sales, sales under special 
circumstances, and sales upon redemption of maturing ORTNs. 
The financial community's perception of the Brazilian govern-
ment's discretion to alter the basis of calculating the ORTN index 
affected both the value of the ORTN and the value of all obli-
gations tied to ORTN adjustments. Several leading commenta-
tors, including the Brazilian Minister of Finance, stated that dur-
ing the 1960s some lenders avoided long-term loans, including 
those with monetary correction, because the rules were in flux. 
More specifically, "[s]ome sensed the risk that in the long-term 
the rules of monetary correction would change before the re-
demption of a long-term obligation."87 By 1975, the government 
sold ORTNs to a regulated market or to those who apparently 
accepted the larger macroeconomic standards of the index. 
Although such rule changes might have had some adverse 
effect on the capacity of the government to place the ORTNs, 
they did not undermine the market as a whole. The Brazilian 
financial public, which consists largely of government instrumen-
86 Id. at 93. 
87 CHACEL, supra note 40, at 113. 
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talities and regulated purchasers, now apparently expects that 
the government will make only those changes that are technically 
justified. Thus, Brazilian indexation represents an effort to en-
trench legally certain aspects of the mixed economy. Its success 
resulted in the creation of a substantial and sophisticated financial 
system in less than two decades. 
South Africa faces many of the same economic problems that 
have beset Brazil and other Latin American countries. Unem-
ployment and crime rates are high. At the same time, double 
digit inflation jeopardizes the financial well-being of individuals 
and corporations alike. Thus, economic stability and expansion 
are threatened. The relative success of Brazil's system of index-
ation in helping the country to overcome many of these obstacles 
makes it a model for a future South Africa. 
Nevertheless, despite the appropriateness of indexation, if the 
South African bench is occupied by conservative judges, there 
may be resistance to any direct continuing role of the state in 
setting the terms of financial agreements. Conservative judges, 
enamored of certain aspects of U.S. Supreme Court jurispru-
dence, might try to interfere with government attempts to create 
a system similar to Brazil's. In support of their position, they 
might rely on the Gold Clause jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme 
Court. 
III. THE UNITED STATES AND THE GOLD CLAUSE DECISIONS 
Brazilian indexation raises legal issues similar to those raised 
by the congressional Gold Resolutions of 193388 which were the 
subject of the famous U.S. Supreme Court Gold Clause decisions 
of 1935.89 In the Gold Clause cases, the U.S. Supreme Court, 
construing the Due Process Clause, the Takings Clause, and the 
Contracts Clause, recognized limitations on the government's 
ability to alter the terms of financial agreements. The indexation 
system as practiced in Brazil, with its adjustments of principal 
balances and its frequent changes in the indexing formula, effec-
tively permits such government changes to contracts. In South 
Africa, the nature of a new constitution is not yet certain, but 
88 Act of May 12, 1933, ch. 25, § 43(b)(I), 48 Stat. 52; Joint Resolution of June 5, 1933, 
48 Stat. 112 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 463 (1970)), repealed by Act of Oct. 28, 1977, Pub. L. 
No. 95-147, 91 Stat. 1227. 
89 Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935); Nortz v. United States, 294 U.S. 317 
(1935); Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 294 U.S. 240 (1935). 
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various proposals make it likely that the document will contain 
clauses similar to those at issue in the Gold Clause cases.90 If the 
high court in a new South Africa were to rely on Gold Clause 
decision reasoning,91 it might establish constitutional limits on 
direct revaluation of private and governmental debt by the gov-
ernment. Given the influence of U.S. Supreme Court jurispru-
dence in South Africa, such a result is a real possibility. 
Before the stock market crash of 1929, which plunged the 
country into the Great Depression, the United States had prom-
ised to pay certain of its obligations in gold coin. In the early 
1930s, Congress enacted legislation abrogating those gold clauses. 
A Joint Resolution of June 5, 1933 provided that all obligations 
requiring payment in gold were against public policy and all 
obligations requiring payment in gold could be discharged by 
payment in legal tender. The obligations which were affected 
included those of the United States itself as well as those of private 
parties.92 In March 1933, the Secretary of the Treasury required 
that all privately held gold coin and bullion be delivered to him.93 
Numerous suits were brought challenging the Gold Clause res-
olutions and seeking payment according to the terms of the 
bonds. The case of Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. is represen-
tative.94 When Congress adopted the Gold Clause resolutions, 
there were approximately $75 billion in obligations outstanding 
similar to those described earlier.95 Norman C. Norman owned a 
$1,000, 4 112 percent bond dated February 1, 1930 and issued 
by the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad. The bond provided that pay-
ment of principal and interest "will be made ... in gold coin of 
the United States of America of or equal to the standard of weight 
and fineness existing on February 1, 1930."96 A $22.50 coupon 
90 Clauses similar to the Contracts, Due Process, and Takings Clauses are all being 
discussed as part of the South African constitutional debate. See, e.g., African National 
Congress, Constitutional Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa, reprinted in 5 S.A. J. HUM. 
RTS. 129 (1989); lnkatha Freedom Part Annual General Conference Refines Positions & Policies, 
3 S.A. UPDATE 1 (1991). 
91 For discussions of the Gold Clause decisions, see John Dawson, The Gold Clause 
Decisions, 33 MICH. L. REV. 648 (1935); Henry Hart, The Gold Clause in United States Bonds, 
48 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1935). 
92 48 Stat. 13 (1933) (codified at 31 U.S.c. § 463 (1976)), repealed by Act of Oct. 28, 
1977, Pub. L. No. 95-147, 91 Stat. 1227. 
93 Emergency Banking Relief Act of 1933, Ch. I, § 2, 48 Stat. 1. 
94 294 U.S. 240 (1935). 
95 ld. at 313. 
96 ld. 
18 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XV, No.1 
of that bond was payable on February 1,1934. Norman presented 
the coupon, demanded payment in gold, did not receive it, and 
then sued the railroad in New York courts for $38.10, a sum he 
claimed was the equivalent in legal tender of the 22.5 gold dollars. 
The railroad pleaded that the various acts of Congress prevented 
it from paying in gold and required only that payment be made 
in legal tender of $22.50. The state courts entered and affirmed 
judgment for $22.50 in legal tender.97 
The U.S. Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice 
Hughes, held that Congress could suspend private obligations to 
repay in gold coin. Hughes, however, distinguished private gold 
obligations from government gold obligations, holding that the 
attempted abrogation of the government's gold obligations was 
unconstitutional. The Court wrote that it was within congressional 
power to regulate the country's currency and establish its mone-
tary system. Congress, in exercising this power over currency, 
could thus alter or impair parties' rights under private contracts, 
without unconstitutionally depriving them of property. It is there-
fore possible that the United States could adopt an index to 
determine the nominal value of its obligations and then alter the 
method by which the index was calculated. United States courts, 
however, could use the rationale of the Gold Clause decisions to 
strike down that alteration as unconstitutional.98 
Nonetheless, South African courts, using the logic of the Gold 
Clause decisions, might not strike down indexing provisions sim-
ilar to Brazil's. Unlike the investors in the Gold Clause cases, 
investors buying bonds subject to such an indexing scheme would 
know that the government retains the discretion to alter the 
index. Thus, if the South African government retained such 
discretion, a court might not find the reasoning of the Gold 
Clause cases dispositive. 
In Perry v. United States,99 John Perry owned a $10,000 Fourth 
Liberty Loan, 4 112 percent gold bond, which had been issued by 
the United States in 1918. The bond read: "[t]he principal and 
interest hereof are payable in United States gold coin of the 
present standard value."IOO The bond was called for redemption 
97 Id. at 292-95. 
98 For a full discussion of the Supreme Court's treatment of retroactive legislation, see 
Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation, 73 HARV. L. 
REV. 692 (1960). 
99 294 U.S. 330 (1935). 
100 Id. 
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on April IS, 1934 and Perry presented it on May 24, 1934 for 
payment of 10,000 gold dollars of the weight and fineness of a 
1918 gold dollar. Upon the refusal of the United States to pay, 
Perry demanded an equivalent payment in gold or $16,931.25, 
which he calculated as the equivalent value in legal tender. The 
United States refused to pay in gold and would not pay more 
than $10,000 in legal tender. Perry brought suit in the Court of 
Claims, which certified the following question to the Supreme 
Court: Did the Gold Clause entitle Perry to receive "an amount 
in legal tender currency in excess of the face amount of the 
bond?"101 This question was particularly important because as of 
May 31, 1933, government obligations totalling approximately 
$21 billion had similar gold clauses. 
Chief Justice Hughes wrote the majority opinion, indicating 
that the Gold Clause "was intended to afford protection against 
loss ... by setting up a standard or measure of the Government's 
obligation."102 The promise "was intended to assure one who lent 
his money to the Government and took its bond that he would 
not suffer loss through depreciation in the medium of pay-
ment."103 The Court concluded that Congress could not use its 
constitutional power to regulate the value of money as a means 
for directly altering the terms of its obligations. The U.S. con-
tractual obligations were no less binding than the obligations of 
individuals. To exercise its constitutional power to issue public 
debt,104 Congress needed the sovereign capacity to bind itself to 
a contract, including the one with Perry to pay 10,000 gold dollars 
of the present value. Thus the Court concluded, to the extent 
that the Gold Clause resolutions attempted to abrogate the gov-
ernment's contract with Perry, they were unconstitutional. 105 
Having enunciated a firm principle that the Constitution pro-
hibits Congress from abrogating its contracts, the Supreme Court 
refused to give Perry more than the legal tender for the $10,000 
face amount of the bond. The Court held that the damages done 
to Perry by the government's breach of the bond's terms were 
nominal. When Perry presented his bond for redemption in gold 
coin, the export of gold was prohibited without a Treasury license 
101 Id. at 346-47. 
102 Id. at 348. 
103 Id. at 349. 
104 Id. at 354. 
105 Id. 
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and gold could not be used for payment of private debts. Under 
executive orders prohibiting the private ownership of gold, Perry 
was not entitled to own more than a trivial amount of gold unless 
he received a Treasury license or was subject to another special 
exemption. There was no legal private market for the gold which 
the Court had decided he was otherwise entitled to have. I06 The 
government's obligation to pay in gold was intended only to 
protect Perry against depreciation in the dollar's purchasing 
power and, given the interim deflation, payment in gold would 
have given Perry more in real terms than he could have reason-
ably expected at the time of purchase. I07 Hence, a substantial 
element of unjust enrichment would have occurred if Perry were 
paid in gold. 
The general thrust of Perry-that a sovereign can bind itself to 
contracts-appears rooted in the belief that the government, hav-
ing entered the market to borrow, should be treated like any 
other borrower. The specific, dispositive holding-that Perry 
should not get gold dollars of the promised weight and fineness-
was based on a finding that unforeseeable events such as eco-
nomic collapse, substantial deflation, and government actions af-
fecting the gold market would have worked substantial unjust 
enrichment. 
Norman l08 is distinguishable from Perry. In Norman, congres-
sional reordering of private obligations was acceptable. Congress 
has the authority to regulate the currency and establish the mon-
etary system of the country. Thus, the Norman Court determined 
that because Congress, in exercising its power over currency, may 
alter or impair the rights of parties under private contracts, there 
was no deprivation of property without due process of law. In 
contrast, the Perry Court held that the United States had no 
constitutional power to abrogate its obligations incurred in the 
exercise of its power to borrow upon the credit of the govern-
ment. 109 Therefore, it was liable for damages in the event of 
breach. 
In United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey,110 the Court applied the 
Contract Clause1ll to strike down a state's attempt to vary legis-
106 [d. at 358. 
107 [d. at 342-44. 
108 See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text. 
109 See supra notes 100-08 and accompanying text. 
liD 431 U.S. 1 (1977). 
III U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, d. 1. 
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lation that was interpreted as forming part of a bondholder's 
security.ll2 The Court cited Perry as support for applying a 
harsher standard of review under the Contract Clause to a state's 
action concerning its own obligations than to a state's action af-
fecting only private obligations. ll3 It also announced a dual con-
stitutional standard for testing New Jersey's attempt to vary the 
bond's security: (1) the action had to be a reasonable, unforeseen 
exercise of the state's police power; and (2) there had to be no 
less restrictive alternatives available to implement the state's goals. 
Because New Jersey failed to meet this dual standard, the legis-
lation was inconsistent with the Contract Clause. 114 
In Norman, the Supreme Court carefully distinguished private 
contracts from government contracts, declaring that a private 
contract dealing with a matter that Congress could regulate con-
stitutionally must bend to the act of Congress. ll5 Congress had 
enacted the Gold Clause legislation in the exercise of its authority 
"to coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign 
coin."116 The Court thus held the legislation to be reasonably 
related to a valid congressional function. 117 
Later decisions also upheld retroactive legislation affecting pri-
vate contracts. The Court rejected the argument that a retro-
spective application of the legislation would violate a party's rights 
to due process of law. In Fleming v. Rhodes,1l8 for example, the 
Court reviewed price control legislation allowing the Truman 
Administration to enjoin eviction proceedings where the leased 
properties were subject to price controls. The landlords in ques-
tion obtained eviction orders before the legislation was enacted. 
The administrator later sought to enjoin actual eviction after the 
enactment. The district court held that such action to enjoin 
previously acquired "vested rights" violated the Fifth Amend-
ment's guarantee of due process. The Supreme Court reversed 
on the grounds that: 
[f]ederal regulation of future action based upon rights pre-
viously acquired by the person regulated is not prohibited by 
the Constitution. So long as the Constitution authorizes the 
112 431 u.s. 1 (1977). 
113 Id. at 26, n.25. 
114 Id. at 29-32. 
115 Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 294 U.S. 240, 306-11 (1935). 
116 Id. at 303. 
117 Id. at 31l. 
118 331 U.S. 100 (1947). 
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subsequently enacted legislation, the fact that its provisions 
limit or interfere with previously acquired rights does not 
condemn it .... Immunity from federal regulation is not 
gained through forehanded contracts. 1l9 
Thus, the Supreme Court has established a preference, in certain 
instances, for retroactive legislation. 
IV. THE ApPLICABILITY OF THE GOLD CLAUSE CASES TO 
INDEXATION IN SOUTH AFRICA 
In a post-apartheid South Africa beset by inflation and myriad 
other economic problems, a conservative approach by judges 
might damage investor confidence in ways that would be detri-
mental to the long-term health of the economy. By refusing to 
allow the state to have a continuing direct role in establishing the 
terms of financial agreements, the courts would prevent the gov-
ernment from being able to shield investors from inflation. The 
absence of such a shield would discourage not only corporate 
investment, but also investment by members of the nascent black 
middle class which must grow and thrive if South Africa is to cast 
off its apartheid legacy. Accordingly, it seems most appropriate 
for a system to be developed which would allow even courts 
following the logic of the Gold Clause decisions to permit Brazil-
ian-style indexation. Such indexation is suited to the needs of a 
developing country like South Africa. It should encompass pri-
vate contracts and public obligations. 
As for private contracts, while unforeseen direct revaluation of 
U.S. debts collided with the Constitution under Perry, 120 reorder-
ing private obligations did not under Norman.121 Norman stands 
for the proposition that the Constitution does not impede 
congressional reordering of previously-negotiated contracts. 
Thus, if private parties depended upon a U.S. Department of 
Labor index, Congress constitutionally could legislate a change 
in the index. This legislation would apply to previously-negoti-
ated contracts if the change was reasonably related to a consti-
tutional end, such as the Commerce Clause or Legal Tender 
Clause. Similarly, in a new South Africa, if private parties relied 
on a Department of Manpower index, Parliament could legislate 
119 [d. at 107. 
120 See supra notes 99-107 and accompanying text. 
121 See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text. 
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a change in the index. This legislation would apply to previously-
negotiated contracts if the change was reasonably related to a 
constitutional end such as the economy.122 Parliament might view 
this change and implement it as nothing more than a price control 
with some retroactive effect. Parliament could make such changes 
every few months with minimal efforts. Investors might continue 
to purchase such indexed assets knowing that Parliament, per-
haps by then having delegated the readjustment function to the 
Executive, could continue legislating the index directly or 
through its delegee. Such a system would not be materially dis-
tinguishable from that of Brazil. The scheme could begin on a 
voluntary basis and become compulsory as its popularity in-
creases. One way to help ensure such popularity would be to 
avoid frequent changes in the indexation formula that might 
create uncertainty in the minds of investors. 
With regard to the indexation of public obligations like 
ORTNs, South Africa could adopt an index to determine the 
nominal value of its obligations and later unexpectedly try to alter 
the method by which the index was calculated. Following Nor-
man,123 however, a court might strike down such an alteration as 
unconstitutional. This need not be the case. The government 
should statutorily define its indexing formula and reserve the 
right to alter the index as circumstances require. By explicitly 
retaining the discretion to make adjustments, the government 
would make it less likely that a court would find the logic of 
Norman dispositive. Thus, South Africa would be able to imple-
ment an analogue of the Brazilian system. 
CONCLUSION 
For some years, the South African economy has been in poor 
condition. Among its other woes, the country has suffered from 
a milder version of the inflationary problems experienced by 
Latin American countries such as Brazil. If South Africa is to 
create a new, more equitable society for itself, a post-apartheid 
government will have to conquer daunting economic difficulties. 
This will not be an easy task. There is little agreement about what 
shape the new South African economy should take and particu-
larly what the role of the judges in construing state involvement 
122 See, e.g., supra note 9. 
123 See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text. 
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in the economy should be. It would seem that a system of index-
ation modeled along the lines of Brazil's system would be espe-
cially attractive in South Africa. Conservative judges following 
the logic of the U.S. Supreme Court in the Gold Clause decisions, 
however, might seek to prohibit any direct continuing role for 
the state in setting the terms of financial agreements. Neverthe-
less, analysis reveals that even with economic conservatives on the 
bench, the South African courts could permit the development 
of a structural analogue to the Brazilian system and thus create 
a system of indexation. 
